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Abstract
Prof. Robert Berwick’s abstract for his
forthcoming invited talk at the ACL2016
workshop on Cognitive Aspects of Com-
putational Language Learning revives an
ancient debate. Entitled “Why take a
chance?”, Berwick seems to refer implic-
itly to Chomsky’s critique of the statistical
approach of Harris as well as the currently
dominant paradigms in CoNLL.
Berwick avoids Chomsky’s use of “in-
nate” but states that “the debate over
the existence of sophisticated mental
grammars was settled with Chomsky’s
Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory
(1957/1975)”, acknowledging that “this
debate has often been revived”. Berwick
does not in his abstract mention Gold’s
concerns about what it means to learn a
language, or his concept of “Language
Identification in the Limit” which is of-
ten juxtaposed against the idea of “Proba-
bly Approximately Correct”, but Berwick
specifically questions the counterargument
that “differences in acceptability judge-
ments can be closely approximated ...
from probabilistic accounts”. We discuss
his recent critique of computational exper-
iments that show acceptability judgements
correlating with probabilities from simple
computational models.
This paper agrees with the view that this
debate has long since been settled, but
with the opposite outcome! Given the em-
bers have not yet died away, and the ques-
tions remain fundamental, perhaps it is ap-
propriate to refuel the debate, so I would
like to join Bob in throwing fuel on this
fire!
1 Introduction
In a recent paper at GLOW16 and an invited talk
to be given at CACLL, Berwick et al. (2016ab)
make the strong claim that “debate of the exis-
tence of sophisticated mental grammars was set-
tled with Chomsky’s The Logical Structure of Lin-
guistic Theory (1957/1975)... But this debate has
often been revived.” Yet if it has been “settled” that
begs the question of why it keeps being “revived”.
This conundrum reflects different views of the na-
ture of science, and the nature of learning and cog-
nition, as much as the nature of language.
The reason for these divergent views of the his-
tory of the theory of language learning may relate
to the shifting ground on which the battle has been
fought. In fact, it is not even clear whether the fo-
cus of the debate is what is innate, what is mod-
ular, what is universal, what is recursive, “gra-
dience” of grammaticality, or validity of theories
captured in terms of three letter acronyms: LAD,
PoS, TGG, EST, P&P, G&B, etc.
But then there is also Chomsky’s own
(1986/1991/1993/1995) “Minimalist Program”
(MP). Chomsky doesn’t regard things as settled
by his 1957-75 work and specifically critiques it.
Of further concern is the frequent explanation that
“evolution did it” or, more tongue-in-cheek, “God
does it on Tuesdays”(Fodor in Piatelli-Palmarini,
1979). For Computer Scientists and Computa-
tional Linguists, evolutionary and genetic meth-
ods are weak members of a broader set of Ma-
chine Learning algorithms. Claiming something
cannot be learned with the full power of the ma-
chine learning arsenal, but has been learned with
just the weaker evolutionary techniques, is oxy-
moronic. Alternatively it can be viewed as con-
tradicting either the Church-Turing thesis or the
assumption that the human brain is some kind of
machine.
2 Poverty of Science
While Pinker (1984, 1994, 1997) adheres to the
Chomskian paradigm, defending an innate spe-
cialized modular account of our language capacity,
he treats our scientific capacity within the same
framework, thus making both our language and
science evolutionary artefacts rather than ways to
model the world. This blurs the distinction be-
tween folk biology/psychology/theory and science
unless by applying this limited rationality we have
managed to develop sound logics for argumenta-
tion, as perhaps expressed in formal mathematics,
learning algorithms, and falsificationist accounts
of science. Carruthers et al. (2002/2004) set out
to explore the Pinker account and discount his
negative conclusions about science. What distin-
guishes folk science from real science is that there
is a logic of proof that requires evidence, while
evidence that led to formation of our hypotheses,
even unconsciously, or training data that was used
to learn a model, even indirectly, cannot be used
as evidence in support of a theory. This is particu-
larly a problem for evolutionary theory.
Nagel (2012, p4) states: “I would like to de-
fend the untutored reaction of incredulity to the
reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin
and evolution of life... What is lacking... is a cred-
ible argument that the story has a nonnegligible
probability of being true.” Ironically some propo-
nents of evolutionary accounts seem religious in
reliance on prior beliefs and neglect of their status
as assumptions or hypotheses, and Nagel seeks to
find a dualist middle between religious extremes.
The issue is forgoing the scientific discipline of
providing refutable predictions of the theory (Pop-
per,1934/1959; Lakatos,1970,1976,1978ab). That
is, an evolutionary just-so “story” (Nagel,2012)
or “myth” (Popper,1963) is not sufficient in “ma-
terialist naturalism” or “reductionism” or “em-
piricism” (Nagel,2012,p13f; Popper,1934,1965),
the basis of the modern scientific revolution that
goes back to Galileo and Descartes and explicitly
leaves out appeals to human perception and inten-
tion (Nagel,2012,p35). Indeed Chomsky (1995)
now avoids the word “theory” for his Minimal-
ist Program. Use of the word “program” follow-
ing Lakatos (1970) implies a base of “minimal”
“hard core” assumptions that are assumed but not
subject to falsification, which are assumed along
with further auxiliary hypotheses that are subject
to change in response to empirical evidence.
3 Poverty of Evolution
It is clearly difficult to make provable predictions
for evolutionary theories - Darwin’s theory was
an example of pseudoscience in Lakatos (1970).
But there are ways, and in particular we can adopt
the computational metaphor and treat evolution
as an algorithm . To provide support for LAD
versus its alternatives, its predictions need to dif-
fer from those that derive from alternate models
of language acquisition, development and emer-
gence, such as those provided by Cognitive Lin-
guistics. A Computational Cognitive Linguistics
model proposes mechanisms based on ideas of
similarity (metaphor) within and across modali-
ties (Powers,1997) that are important for survival
(fitness) and which also predict other higher level
phenomena (analogy, metaphor, metonymy, etc.),
and provide accounts for superstitions and illu-
sions. Chomsky (Piatelli-Palmarini, M., 1979) re-
fused to be drawn on how “evolution” achieved his
LAD, saying it was not his job as a linguist, which
is divorcing linguistics from science.
Computational Intelligence split off historically
from Artificial Intelligence over inclusion of such
‘non-logical’ algorithms in our arsenal, although
today evolutionary and genetic techniques, as well
as others modeled on colonies, swarms, etc. are
used regularly across individuals in combination
with adaptive learning within the individual to
try to develop the appropriate structure for be-
havioural learning that will maximize the fitness of
the individual in the environment. Often this is
done without forcing a strict non-communication
of learned information to descendants as enshrined
in both pre-genetic evolutionary theory (life before
genes) and neo-Darwinian Mendelian evolution-
ary theory (strictly speaking genetic models).
While excluded by Cartesian science (Nagel,
2012), Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI) are
specifically brought back in by a dominant ap-
proach to reasoning in Artificial Intelligence.
Questions of consciousness are also explored both
in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science,
and from the perspectives of language and learn-
ing, the “acceptability judgements” that Chom-
sky (1957) and Berwick (2016ab) appeal to de-
pend on hidden variables (normally handled pre-
consciously) being brought to conscious attention
- with the result that acceptability cannot be ex-
plained without appeal to theory, hypotheses and
assumptions, and is self-reinforcing and biased.
4 Poverty of Dichotomy
This begs the question of whether issues with ac-
ceptability are syntactic, semantic or pragmatic,
and Berwick et al. (2016a) expect them to be
syntactic and dichotomous rather than the gra-
dient of gramaticality that Lau, Clark & Lappin
(LCL:2014,2015) explore by correlation of human
Likert-scale judgements with a statistical model.
Berwick questions whether observed correlations
are strong enough to warrant accepting that ac-
ceptability was a matter of probability (wrapping
up a question about gradience of human judge-
ments with a question about the probablistic na-
ture of grammar). The fact that particular simplis-
tic probabilistic or neural models don’t correlate
as well as would be liked with human judgements,
with no competing LAD-PAP model constrasted
with it, proves nothing about whether LAD-PAP
is correct, language is probabilistic, or acceptabil-
ity is graded (nor does it refute it clearly, given
they suggest other causes for the small correlations
seen). The fact that some correlation is observed
in both the original and the replication study, pro-
vides some support for the graded probabilistic ac-
count as it is a prediction of the theory, but is not
conclusive in that direction either.
Berwick et al. (2016a) use data from the gen-
erative linguistics tradition, from papers in Lin-
guistic Inquiry, two sets of examples of acceptable
and unacceptable sentences from textbooks, plus
120 permutations of Chomsky’s “Colorless green
ideas sleep furiously” (inspiring the title of the
replication paper). LCL (2013-15) used examples
from the British National Corpus (BNC) with “in-
felicities introduced by round trip machine transla-
tion”. The Berwick results showed correlation, but
weaker than in the original experiment. But, real
sentences from a corpus of real English have a Zip-
fian distribution, can be well over 100 words long,
and will thus tend to be much longer and more
complicated than short textbook-style examples
composed to make a particular point (and LCL
made a point of examining length and normaliz-
ing for it). Also machine translation into English
will produce a different distribution of “infelici-
ties”. Finally, much of the ‘starring’ of sentences
in linguistic publications, particularly textbooks,
is naive, while LCL dealt with a corpus of real En-
glish and occasionally focussed in on one of the
most prevalent issues of ambiguity (past tense ver-
sus passive participle).
5 Poverty of Tagging
The most common reason for misstarring sen-
tences is part of speech (POS) ambiguity, not rec-
ognizing the flexibility of English to coerce a word
that is intrinsically or overwhelmingly one POS: a
meaning may only be licenced in specific contexts
so that the grammatical possibility is not salient
otherwise. Some words have an auxiliary or modal
role and a literal meaning (be, have, go, ...). A
noun can in general be used to express an action
involving that object (e.g. a body part - “He shoul-
ders the player aside, heads the ball to a team
mate, then legs it back to the goal.”). This is
explored by Entwisle (1997, 1998), leading to a
critique of parsers and metrics that ‘improve’ by
ignoring such choices and tagging with, or bias-
ing to, the most frequent POS. Parsers trained and
tested on handtagged subsets of a corpus then tag
the whole corpus leading to unreliable tags, and
even after attempts to patch them still have cases
that fail systematically. BNC is used in the LSL
(2013-15) studies, but its tags were ignored. They
still exhibit problems (particularly when partici-
ples are involved, or words with concrete and ab-
stract or functional usages). Of 278 instances of
going to work in BNC, only 4 are ambiguous when
viewed in context, and of the remaining 274, we
find 107 are correctly tagged (78 of 88 nouns and
29 of 186 verbs) and 167 are incorrectly tagged
(10 of 88 nouns and 157 of 186 verbs). This per-
formance is not significantly different from chance
(p > 0.1), with the probability of an informed tag
for “work” being 4.4% (Powers,2008, 2012).
The conclusions drawn by Berwick are unreal-
istic in expecting that an unsupervised word-level
trigram model, or a simple RNN, should provide
high performance: it is known that at each level of
linguistic processing, both forward and backward
context of two or more units is indicated as con-
text necessary for correct interpretation (phono-
logical/phonemic, morphological/semantic, gram-
matical/syntactic, ontological/pragmatic, etc.) and
this multilevel multiunit multimodal information
is routinely used in speech recognition, machine
translation, parsing, etc. and higher order model-
ing has been shown to lead to better entropy es-
timates and evaluations. LCL have the opposite
perspective, claiming only that simplistic models
like theirs have predictive ability on real sentences,
compared with Berwick et al.’s (2016a) datasets
that look like teaching examples.
6 Poverty of Psychology/Biology
Chomsky is known for his political and philo-
sophical arguments, and polemical style, as much
as for his linguistic contributions, and his argu-
ments in his linguistic writing often share this po-
litical, polemical and philosophical flavour. His
debating style can in many places be character-
ized as “intentionally obtuse for the purpose of
scoring a debating point” (Palmer,2006, p255;
Piatelli-Palmarini, 1979). Indeed such discussions
of -isms characterize the butting and abutting of
disciplinary viewpoints that triggered the emer-
gence of Cognitive Science generally, as well as
Cognitive Linguistics specifically, as arguments
spilled across disciplinary lines and researchers
tried to synthesize interdisciplinary theories that
were consistent across different forms of theory
and evidence. Chomsky’s (1959) “linguist” per-
spective on Skinner’s (1957) “behaviourist” treat-
ment of language was in fact what really cata-
pulted him to fame, although again here he was
faulted both for his lack of understanding of “be-
haviourism” and his “several serious errors of
logic” (MacCorquodale,1970) and “revealed mis-
understandings so great that they undercut the
credibility of the review substantially... a kind
of ill-conceived dam in the progress of science,
a rhetorically effective but conceptually flawed
document that would eventually be overborne”
(Palmer,2006,p253; 2000).
Chomsky (1957) had no biological evidence
that specific hypothesized parts of speech (Noun,
Verb, etc.) and grammatical constructs (word,
phrase, clause, sentence, etc.) or linguistic mod-
ules (phonology, morphology, etc.) actually ex-
ist in the mind of the native speaker in any sense.
Even today, when modern neuroscience is start-
ing to be able to look at what is happening during
language processes, the maps do not correspond
straightforwardly to specific linguistic predictions
or theories, or show loci for words or POS (Pul-
vermuller,1999; Huth et al.,2016). However, we
can do better now than just talk about Broca’s area
being near the motor areas presumably involved in
producing speech and Wernicke’s area being near
the auditory areas presumably involved in under-
standing speech, with the observation that the dis-
ruption caused by damage to these areas affects
more than just the nearby modality gives insights
and a more sensorimotor foundation for a theory
of language (Powers and Turk, 1989).
7 Poverty of Generative Linguistics
Chomsky is also attributed with bringing ‘gen-
erative’ formalism to Linguistics, but as Pullum
(2011) points out Chomsky’s first published book
“Syntactic Structures” (SS: Chomsky (1957) did
not address the question of whether English was a
Finite State language, or propose an innate Lan-
guage Acquisition Device (LAD) in the 1950s,
and nor did he in “The Logical Structure of Lin-
guistic Theory” (LSLT) the draft typescript from
1955, updated in manuscipt in 1956, and cited by
Berwick in the form in limited circulation in the
US in 1957, nor even in the final severely revised
form published in 1975. SS (Chomsky, 1957)
does advocate Transformational Generative Gram-
mar (TGG), building on an unformalized notion
of transforms that Harris is suggested to have bor-
rowed from Carnap, and which is used inconsis-
tently giving incorrect results in SS with a treat-
ment incompatible with LSLT (Pullum, 2011) .
The mathematical formalism behind the TGG,
and indeed the so-called Chomsky hierarchy, goes
back to Post, who in turn drew on Whitehead
and Russel (Pullum, 2011). By the time LSLT
(Chomsky, 1957/75) was published, the compre-
hensive review of Heny (1979) notes, Chomsky
was already withdrawing his support from TGG
and had reduced his number of proposed tranfor-
mations down to one or two. Eventually in the
Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995), the distinc-
tion between deep structure and surface structure
had been eliminated in favour of a more explicitly
derivational approach, with X-bar theory devolv-
ing to pure phrase structure! Thus it is hard to see
that anything was “settled” by LSLT in 1957.
Anderson (2007/8) makes LSLT the title of a
Presidential Address to LSA, and revisits many
of these issues - hardly “settled”. Every year this
debate has been “revived” in multiple papers and
books and venues like Behavioural and Brain Sci-
ences. It forced the founding of the Cognitive Lin-
guistics Journal and associated societies: rather
than generated from an internal LAD the CogL
focus is on the metaphor-driven emergence of lan-
guage from general mechanisms for understand-
ing and interacting with our world (Lakoff and
Johnson,1980,1987). Powers (1983,1991b,1997)
connects this to the Psycholinguistic theory of Pi-
aget (1923, 1936, 1950; Piatelli-Palmarini,1979)
and the generalized Emic theory of Pike (1947,
1948,1954, 1955).
8 Poverty of Grammar
Powers and Turk’s (1989) argument that Chom-
sky’s approach is not neurologically or com-
putationally plausible presents evidence of vi-
olating Chomsky’s agreed assumptions (Hock-
ett,1961), as well as discussing the implica-
tions of computational language learning mod-
els. We have a rich supply, with early mod-
els including Adriaans (1992ab,1993), Ander-
son (1975), Block (1975), Ellison(1993), En-
twisle (1997), Finch (1993), Gold(1967), Horn-
ing(1969), Powers (1983, 1991a), Siklossy (1971)
and Turk (1984,1988,1990) and extending beyond
the reaches of grammar! It is worth noting that the
phonology work of Bird and Ellison (1994) traces
back to that of Goldsmith (1976) who framed his
work (with some difficulty it seems) in the Chom-
skian framework, while the semantic directions re-
late specifically to the idea that language is im-
possible without what Hayes (1979) calls Naive
Physics, Powers (1983, 1991ab) calls Ontology,
Harnad (1990,1991) calls Symbol Grounding, or
Feldman, Lakoff, Stolcke & Weber (1990) call L0.
This goes beyond dictionaries, thesauri, seman-
tic nets and taxonomies to require multimodal neu-
ral connections between multiple sensory-motor
modalities and thus establish real meaning in the
physical world rather than just chasing words
around a dictionary or its electronic equivalent.
It provides an answer for debates around Searle’s
(1980) Chinese Room and Harnad’s (1990) To-
tal Turing Test, and the broader Connectionism vs
Symbolism Debate (Powers,1992), and acknowl-
edges the supervisory possibilities of multimodal
learning (Powers and Turk, 1989) and memory-
based anticipated correction (Turk, 1984, 1988,
1990). This also connects to Berwick and Chom-
sky’s focus on so-called generative grammar - in
fact, Powers and Turk (1989) discuss evidence of
separate learning of language understanding mod-
els near sensory/hearing processing areas of the
brain (e.g. Wernicke’s area) and language gen-
eration models near motor/speech centres of the
brain (Broca’s area), as well as prediction of mir-
roring regions that connect what we hear and see
with what we produce ourselves and others reflect
(mothers mirror their babies more than vice versa).
This can be seen to predict the recent discov-
ery of mirror neurons (Arbib, 2009), and builds on
classic Piagetian treatment of reflection and imita-
tion in learning (Piaget, 1923,1936,1950).
9 Poverty of the Stimulus
Mirror neurons fire not only when the subject per-
forms an action, but when they see someone else
perform the action. We subdivide imitation into
three distinct paradigms: 2a. the child speaks
and the parent echoes (mirroring), 2b. the par-
ent speaks and the child echoes (echolalia), and
2c. the child speaks and is directly mirrored
(via a physical mirror or a camera and monitor
setup). These are listed in decreasing order of
importance and commonality: the parent echoes
the child much more than vice-versa (Oostenbroek
et al.,2016), and this is enshrined in the kind of
peek-a-boo games played with infants, as well as
the encouragement and shaping of the child’s pro-
towords (Dada she said Dada!), on the other hand
the mirror or camera is not usually available, and
the child must actually learn to recognize herself,
and the fascination with mirrors and cameras thus
comes at a relatively late stage.
In the end the real problem with the Nativist and
the Symbolist positions is that they rely only on
explicit linguistic ‘stimulus’ - humans rely on con-
necting symbols with real world sensory input and
motor output, as well as proprioceptive and mir-
rored signals that combine and relate sensory and
motor information.
The Poverty of the Stimulus (PoS) argument fo-
cuses on syntax to the exclusion of semantics and
pragmatics, experience and ontology. On the other
hand Cognitive Linguistics emphasizes the role of
similarity or metaphor in language, seeing pat-
terns learned in the real world as models for those
learned in language (e.g. Lakoff et al.,1980,1987;
Goldberg,2006,2008), while Computational Intel-
ligence emphasizes the role of similarity or cor-
relation in learning so that multimodal similarity
should be fundamental to Computational Cogni-
tive Linguistic models of language learning and
be consistent with physical limitations on mem-
ory and processing as well as the computational
limitations on language that result, with (Pow-
ers,1997) proposing a variant blackboard model
embedded in neural strata (shifting through the
layers in time, with versions of grammar rules im-
plicitly enshrined in each layer). Bod (as recently
as 2009), commenting on Goldberg (2006,2008),
decried the lack of a learning model, of a con-
nection between Natural Language Learning and
Cognitive Linguistics, emphasizing that it is im-
portant to make one.
10 Poverty of the Poverty argument
Chomskian linguistics relies heavily on Gold
(1967) in arguing for Poverty of the Stimulus
(PoS), asserting that language can’t be learned be-
cause babies do not receive negative information
(stimulus) required for learning.
However, the results of Gold (1967), Horning
(1969) and Adriaans (1992ab) that superfinite lan-
guages can be learned without such explicit stim-
ulus are ignored. Gold (1967) noted that his proof
broke down if the input was ordered, for exam-
ple if a simple usage of a construction was used
before a recursive usage of the construction (call-
ing this “anomalous text” and opening the door
to ignoring it). Horning (1969) generalized this
to probabilistic information (viz. seeing clear
non-recursive constructs sufficiently often to over-
come the noise-like effects of overly complex con-
structs, consistent with psycholinguistic evidence
that “we can only learn what we almost already
know”). Adriaans (1992ab) extended to a catego-
rial grammar, showing that language learning from
a corpus was possible in this context.
Based on psycholinguistic evidence, Powers
and Turk (1989) argue that “a child only learns
what they almost already know” , that the criterion
of “anomalous test” can be met by a self-organized
filter, and that the “anticipated correction” is pro-
vided unsupervised (Turk,1984,1988,1990). This
is the idea of “acceptability” applied to one’s own
speech! This is what a native speaker/learner
would accept as normal sounding speech, and
mixes up accent, phonetic exactitude, aptness of
word choice, and other semantic and pragmatic as-
pects, with the pure syntactic idea of (grammati-
cal) acceptability that Linguists employ, and illus-
trate with made-up sentences in text books.
Thus measuring acceptability based on written
sentences is measuring acceptability in a language
that is technically different from the ‘evolved’
Natural Language of untutored speech, as it is a
‘prescriptive’ language that is taught in schools,
and we also show that it rises above the com-
putability limitations on the complexity of nat-
ural speech that are imposed by the size of the
human brain. Experiments with complex (e.g.
centre-embedded) constructs do demonstrate that
a higher complexity can be dealt with in writing
compared with speech (and often the inability to
deal with a construct is marked as unacceptability
by the non-linguist).
11 Poverty of the Acceptability argument
It is important to observe that the Chomskian as-
sumption that language is recursive is just an as-
sumption (if part of the Minimalist Program). In
terms of Theory of Computation, it is arguable
that language is recurrent rather than recursive
- that is there is a finite amount of real estate
that is reallocated as needed, accepting sentences
with a non-contracting Context Sensitive Gram-
mar (CSG) rather than an unbounded ‘stack’ that
grows as needed, generating sentences of un-
bounded length and complexity.
Due to its finite size, the brain is a Finite
State Automaton (FSA) not a Pushdown Automa-
ton (PDA) or Turing Machine (TM). A genera-
tive Context Free Grammar (CFG) requires an un-
bounded stack to generate its full range of sen-
tences, while a Regular Grammar (or FSA) is
equivalent to iteration or recurrence and doesn’t
require an unbounded stack to generate sentences
with full range complexity. Powers (1997) embed-
ded a cycling blackboard model of cognition into a
finite network where sensorimotor stimuli and re-
sponses are processed through layers of neurons.
Analogous processing takes place over multiple
layers and modalities, and the same CFG or CSG
rule can be reflected while disallowing recursion.
The invention of writing, adds a stack of paper
(so person+paper = PDA). Thus written language
can exceed the bounds on spoken language and po-
tentially prove the reality of recursion (except that
those schooled in Reading, wRiting and aRith-
metic have been schooled in the basics of prescrip-
tive grammar, and thus should be using Recursive
Rules they have been schooled in, rather than Nat-
ural Language - this effect of teaching of invented
grammar rules is seen in the mangled construc-
tions students, and teachers of English, come out
with as they try to speak proper by applying the
rules they paid for in their education).
The invention of the eraser, and the ability to
go back and forward in our notes without destroy-
ing them, provides us with an essentially unlimited
amount of Turing Machine tape we can move back
and forwards on. More conveniently, today we use
word-processors, with essentially unbounded file
space, which allows us to go back and change what
we have written. A person with a word processor,
or pen+eraser+paper, is a Turing Machine. The
Church-Turing thesis says there is nothing more
powerful.
12 Conclusion
Here we have treated in each column issues that
are debated in other places at booklength, re-
viewing less accessible pre-web theses and books
plus early work that “settles” against Chom-
sky (1957/75), as well as considering the recent
contributions replicated with TGG examples by
(Berwick et al., 2016a). Now we focus conclud-
ing remarks on Berwick’s titles, emphasizing that
the debate is anything but settled by Chomsky.
“Why take a chance?”
Acceptability judgements are influenced by con-
textual factors (the PoS examples) as well as
modality (spoken vs written) and of course reg-
ister, dialect, idiolect, etc. (for the purposes of this
paper we go along with the assumption that there
is such a language as “English”). With accept-
ability judgements we balance comprehensibility
(I can figure out what was meant) with aptness
(it could have been better expressed) with innova-
tion (a new metaphor, metonymy, personification,
figure of speech, or PoS-generalization has been
used) with actual clear syntactic error - though
their origin may be typos or substitutions not com-
petence (Huang and Powers,2001; Powers,1997).
Far from settling a debate, Chomsky’s The Log-
ical Structure of Linguistic Theory (1957/75) ini-
tiated a furore with an array of assumptions and
assertions that many have thought dead and gone,
including many that were discarded in Chomsky’s
Minimalist Program (1986/1991/1993/1995). If
anything, since the emergence of Cognitive Sci-
ence, Computational Cognitive Science, Cognitive
Linguistics, Computational Psycholinguistics and
their permutations, the various interdisciplinary
communities have tended to settle strongly on the
opposing side, opposing the idea of sophisticated
innate language modules with a strictly immutable
idea of grammatical acceptability implemented in
a physical Language Aquisition Device “as real
as the heart or the liver” (Chomsky in Piatelli-
Palmarini, M.,1979).
Although Berwick (2016b) asks “Why take a
chance?” is it Berwick and Chomsky who are re-
lying on chance in saying language is innate rather
than learned, and relegating the problem to myste-
rious and unknowable processes of natural selec-
tion and evolution, rather than allowing for learn-
ing by far more powerful members of our compu-
tational learning arsenal?
“Colorless green ideas sleep furiously”
Ironically, Chomsky’s grammatical but suppos-
edly nonsensical sentence, reflected in Berwick et
al. (2016a)’s title and 120 permutation corpus, are
used by their opponents to characterize this “set-
tled” debate. They may think they have settled
their baby to sleep, but many remain unimpressed
by the unripe ideas of Chomsky (1957-1995), and
their lack of ability to paint a realistic world pic-
ture that encompasses the rich multimodal techni-
color of language and ontology and understanding
and communication and interaction... within our
world, our society and our culture. Perhaps we
have let sleeping ideas lie too long. The dreams
that we pursue so furiously as Linguistic and Psy-
cholinguistic researchers are still shaped, one way
or another, by the assumptive embers of this sleepy
smouldering debate.
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